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the interest of the debt due, it seems that he should pay interest on the surplus rents and profits. Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Sumner’s C. C. R. 143.

In the ordinary cases, where the relation of the mortgagor and mortgagee is uncontroverted, if a mortgagee receive the rents of a mortgaged estate after his debt has been satisfied, and retain them to his own use, without paying them over to the mortgagor, he is chargeable with interest. Ibid.

If, however, there are sufficient equitable circumstances in favor of the mortgagee; as if he retained the rents under a mistake, supposing the rights of the mortgagor extinguished; he would not be liable for the interest until after notice of the adverse claim. Ibid.

Interest on the amount of the debt as ascertained by the decree of the circuit court, was allowed from the time of the judgment; but the damages allowed by the court were not permitted to bear interest. Jennings et al., Plaintiffs in Error v. The Brig Perseverence, 3 Dall. 336; 1 Cond. Rep. 154.

Interest is to be calculated to the present time, upon the aggregate sum of principal and interest in the judgment below; but not to the next term of the circuit court, when the mandate will operate, as the party has a right to pay the money immediately. Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 157.

Interest is, in general, allowed from the time a demand is made for the wages of a mariner; and if no special demand is made, then from the commencement of the suit. Gammell v. Skinner, 2 Gallis. C. C. R.

If captured property is ordered to be sold, then no interest is allowed. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 291; 2 cond. Rep. 98.

Interest commences on a pecuniary legacy at the expiration of one year from the decease of the testator, whatever may be the posture of the estate, unless some other period is specified in the will. The cases of infant children, not otherwise provided for, and of adopted children under age, are exceptions to the general rule. Sullivan v. Winthrop, 1 Sumner’s C. C. R. 1.

Where the executors invested certain sums, less than the whole amount of the legacy, in the name of the legatee; held, that this was, pro tanto, a payment of the legacy; and that the interest accruing on those sums, within the year from the time of such investment, belonged to the legatee. Ibid.

Where the vendor is indebted to the vendee, and the sale is made in order to pay the debt, the vendor must pay interest from the time the debt is liquidated until he makes a good title; and the vendee is accountable for the rents and profits from the time the contract is perfected, until it is specifically performed. Hepburn et al. v. Dunlop & Co., 1 Wheat. 179; 3 Cond. Rep. 529.

A party is as well entitled to interest on an appeal bond, as if he were to proceed on the judgment, if the judgment be on a contract for the payment of money. He is entitled to interest from the rendition of the original judgment. Sneed et al. v. Wister et al. 8 Wheat. 690; 3 Cond. Rep. 529.

The taking of interest in advance upon the discount of a note in the usual course of business by a banker, is not usury. This has long been settled, and is not now open for controversy. Thornton v. The Bank of Washington, 3 Peters, 40.

The taking of interest for sixty-four days on a note is not usury, if the note given for sixty days, according to the custom and usage in the banks at Washington, was not due and payable until the sixty-fourth day. In the case of Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581, it was expressly held, that under that custom the note was not due and payable before the sixty-fourth day; for until that time the maker could not be in default. Ibid. 40.

Where it was the practice of the party, who had a sixty day note discounted at the bank of Washington, to renew the note by the discount of another note on the sixty-third day, the maker not being in fact bound to pay the note according to the custom prevailing in the District of Columbia; such a transaction on the part of the banker is not usurious, although on each note the discount for sixty-four days was deducted. Each note is considered as a distinct and substantive transaction. If no more than legal interest is taken upon the time the new note has to run, the actual application of the proceeds of the new note to the payment of the former note before it comes due, does not of itself make the transaction usurious. Something more must occur. There must be a contract between the bank and the party at the time of such discount, that the party shall not have the use and benefit of the proceeds until the former note becomes due, or that the bank shall have the use and benefit of them in the mean time. Ibid.

The contract to accept the bills of exchange on which the action was brought, was made in Charleston, South Carolina. The bills were drawn in Georgia on B. and H. in Charleston, with a view to their payment in Charleston, where the contract was to be executed. The interest on the bill which was so drawn and was unpaid, is to be charged at the rate of interest in South Carolina. Boyce & Henry v. Edwards, 4 Peters, 111.

Interest is not chargeable on money collected by the marshal of the District of Columbia for fines due to the levy court, the money having been actually expended by the marshal in repairs and improvements on the jail, under the opinions of the comptroller and auditor of the treasury department, that these expenditures were properly chargeable upon this fund, although those opinions may not be well founded. Levy Court of Washington v. Ringgold, 5 Peters, 451.

In an action brought on a note given for payment for teas, the defence was, that teas of an inferior quality were delivered; the jury must not credit the defendant with the amount of damages, as of the day the teas were delivered, but as of the day when the verdict was rendered. The interest on the note is to be reckoned to the day of the verdict, and from that amount is to be deducted the amount of the damages ascertained by the jury. Youqua v. Nixon et al. Peters’ C. C. R. 229.

Assumpsit was brought for the proceeds of a cargo which was taken under legal process by the defendants, the consignees, in a foreign port, for the debts of the prior owners of the ship. Held, that the plaintiffs, the consignors, by bringing assumpsit, had waived the tort that the customary commissions should be allowed the defendants; but that the defendants were chargeable with interest from the receipt by them of the proceeds of the cargo. Ricketson v. Wright, 3 Sumner’s C. C. R. 335. thousand nine hundred and fifty-one dollars be, and the same is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to supply any deficiency which may exist in the navy pension fund, for the payment of the semi-annual navy pensions, which will be due on the first day of July, eighteen hundred and forty-two.