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Where a British statute is re-enacted in this country, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature designed to adopt, as well the settled construction which had been given to the act by the British courts, as the act itself. Kirkpatrick et al. v. Gibson’s Executors, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 388.In doubtful cases, a court should compare all the parts of a statute, and different statutes in pari materia, to ascertain the intention of the legislature. The Sloop Elizabeth, Paine’s C. C. R. 11.Semble: That in questions of commercial law the courts of the United States are not concluded by the local construction proceeding from state courts. Donnell v. The American Ins. Co., 2 Sumner’s C. C. R. 366.In the construction of statutes, one part must be construed by another. In order to attest the legislative intention, the whole statute must be inspected. Strode v. Stafford Justices, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 162.It is a rule of law that a statute applicable in its terms to particular actions, cannot be applied by construction to other actions standing on the same reasons. Jacob v. The United States, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 520.Penal laws must be construed to strictly to bring the case within the definition of the law, but not so as to exclude a case within their ordinary acceptation. The United States v. Wilson and Porter, 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 78.Laws are construed strictly to save a right, to avoid a penalty; and liberally to give a remedy, or effect an object declared in the law. Whitney et al. v. Emmett et al., 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 316.The provisions of a law which are merely directory, are not to be construed into conditions precedent. Ibid.The mercantile terms are to be taken in the sense intended, which is to be ascertained by the laws in pari materia. The United States v. Twenty-four Coils of Cordage, 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 505.The words of a law imposing a forfeiture or penalty, should not be construed to embrace a case not within the parts of the law which prohibits the act done, or direct the performance of an act, by the omission of which the penalty or forfeiture is incurred. Ibid. 508.If a section of an act of Congress admits two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and the other pushes it beyond the constitutional authority of Congress; it is the duty of the Supreme Court to adopt the former construction; because a presumption never ought to be indulged, that Congress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional authority; unless that construction is forced on the court by language altogether incongruous. The United States v. Combe, 12 Peters, 72.Upon the general principles of interpreting statutes, when the words are general, the court are not at liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enactment. Ibid.The office of a proviso, generally, is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview. Ibid.The court construing an act will not consider the motives, or reasons, or opinions, expressed by individual members of Congress in debate, but will look, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed. Aldridge et al. v. Williams, 3 Howard, 1.An act of Congress imposing a duty upon imports, must be construed to describe the article upon which the duty is imposed according to the commercial understanding of the terms used in the law, in our own markets, at the time when the law was passed. Curtis v. Martin, 3 Howard, 106.Revenue laws for the prevention of fraud, for the suppression of a public wrong, or to effect a public good, are not in a strict sense penal statutes, although they impose a penalty. But they ought to be so construed as most effectually to accomplish the intention of the legislature, in passing them, instead of being construed with great strictness in favour of the defendant. Taylor et al. v. The United States, 3 Howard, 197.A clause of forfeiture in a law is to be construed differently from a similar clause in an engagement between individuals. A legislature may impose it as a punishment, but individuals can only make it a matter of contract. The State of Maryland v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 3 Howard, 534.Statutes in pari materia, should be taken into consideration in construing a law. If a thing contained in a subsequent statute be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the meaning of that statute. The United States v. Freeman, 3 Howard, 556.If it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, this will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute. Ibid.The meaning of the legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from the reason or motive on which the legislature proceeded, from the end in view, or the purpose which was designed; the limitation of the rule being that to extend the meaning in any case not included within the words, the case must be shown to come within the same reason upon which the law-maker proceeded, and not a like reason. Ibid.In affirmative statutes, such part of a prior as may be incorporated into the subsequent statute, as consistent with it, must be considered in force. Davies v. Fairbairn, 3 Howard, 636.If a subsequent statute be not repugnant in all its provisions to a prior one, yet if the latter statute clearly intended to prescribe the only rules which should govern, it repeals the prior one. Ibid.In the construction of penal statutes, the proper course is to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes, in the fullest manner, the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. The United States v. Weaver, 3 Sumner’s C. C. R. 208.In construing an act of Congress, if there be a mistake apparent on the face of the act, which may May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-four; And provided, That all manufactures of cotton, or of which cotton shall be a component part, not dyed, colored, printed, or stained, not exceeding in value thirty cents the square yard, shall be valued at thirty cents per square