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where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided; unless the meaning of the legislature be plain; in which case it must be obeyed. United States v. Fisher et al., Assignees of Blight, 2 Cranch, 358; 1 Cond. Rep. 421.That the consequences to be considered in expounding laws, where the intent is doubtful, is a principle not to be contradicted; but it is also true, that it is a principle which must be applied with caution; and which has a degree of influence dependent on the nature of the case to which it is applied, when rights are infringed. Ibid.Where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects. But when only a political regulation is made which is inconvenient; if the intention of the legislature be expressed in terms which are sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind, when the words are taken in their ordinary sense; it would be going a great way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them, to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in the legislature, when the act was passed; and which, in their opinion, was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it was calculated to produce. Ibid.In cases depending on the statutes of a state, the settled construction of these statutes, by the state courts, is to be regarded. Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; 3 Cond. Rep. 286.In the construction of the statutes or local laws of a state, it is frequently necessary to recur to the history and situation of the country, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of many of them, to enable a court to apply with propriety the different rules for construing statutes. Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115; 3 Cond. Rep. 508.The best judges in England have been of opinion, that relaxing the construction of the statute of frauds ought not to be extended further than it has already been carried; and the Supreme Court entirely concurs in that opinion. Grant v. Naylor, 4 Cranch, 224; 2 Cond. Rep. 95.An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains; and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations, as understood in this country. Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; 1 Cond. Rep. 358.When an act of Congress is revived by a subsequent act, it is revived precisely in that form, and with that effect, which it had at the moment when it expired. The cargo of the Brig Aurora v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 382; 2 Cond. Rep. 540.It is a general rule, in the construction of public statutes, that the word “may” is to be construed “must,” in all cases where the legislature mean to impose a positive and absolute duty, and not merely to give a discretionary power. And in all cases, the construction should be such as carries into effect the true intent and meaning of the legislature in the enactment. Minor et al. v. The Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 1 Peters, 46.Where English statutes, such for instance as the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations, have been adopted into our own legislation; the known and settled construction of those statutes by English courts of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts; or has been received with all the weight of authority. Pennock v. Dialogue et al., 2 Peters, 1.Where the question upon the construction of the statute of a state relative to real property has been settled by any judicial decision in the state where the land lies; the Supreme Court, upon the uniform principles adopted by it, would recognise that decision as a part of the local law. Gardner v. Collins, 2 Peters, 58.A legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature, apparent upon its face. Every technical rule as to the construction or force of particular terms, must yield to the clear expression of the paramount will of the legislature. Wilkinson v. Leland et al., 2 Peters, 627.In cases not absolutely closed by authority, the Supreme Court has always expressed a strong inclination not to extend the operation of the statute of frauds so as to embrace the original and distinct promises, made by different persons at the same time, upon the same general consideration. Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 182.The Supreme Court has been often called upon to consider the sixteenth section of the, and as often, either expressly or by the course of its decisions, has held that it is merely declaratory; making no alteration whatever in the rules of equity on the subject of legal remedy. Boyce’s Executors v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210.The rule which has uniformly been observed by the Supreme Court in construing statutes, is to adopt the construction made by courts of the country, by whose legislature the statute was enacted. This rule may be susceptible of some modification, when applied to British statutes which are adopted in any of the states. By adopting them they become our own, as entirely as if they had been enacted by the legislature of the state. Cathcart et al. v. Robinson, 5 Peters, 264.The construction which British statutes had received in England at the time of their adoption in this country, indeed to the time of the separation of this country from the British empire, may very properly be considered as accompanying the statutes themselves, and forming an integral part of them. But however subsequent decisions may be respected, and certainly they are entitled to great respect, their absolute authority is not admitted. If the English courts vary their construction of a statute which is common to both countries, we do not hold ourselves to fluctuate with them. Ibid.Generally statutes are to be construed to operate in futuro, unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended. Prince v. The United States, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 204.The word ‘or’ has sometimes been construed to mean ‘and.’ Such construction has been clearly necessary to give effect to a clause in a will, or to some legislative provision, but never to change a contract at pleasure. Douglass v. Eyre, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 148. Third. On all manufactures of cotton, or of which cotton shall be a component part, twenty-five per centum ad valorem, excepting cotton twist, yarn, and thread, which shall remain at the rate of duty fixed by the, of twenty-second