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But if the agreement were to pay a particular sum, on failure to perform the contract; or if the case was such that the plaintiff has his election to bring either trespass or case for money had and received, and waives the former by bringing the latter; the damages become a debt, which the law implies a promise to pay, and the certificate as a bar. Ibid. In an action brought against the owner of a vessel for damages for an injury sustained on board a ship by the neglect of the master, a certificate of bankruptcy cannot be pleaded in bar. Ibid. One guilty of perjury in proceedings under the bankrupt law, cannot be prosecuted for the offence, after the repeal of the law. United States v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372. A deed executed before the 1st of June, 1800, although acknowledged after, is not within the 1st section of the bankrupt act of April 4th, 1800, chap. 19. Wood v. Owings, 1 Cranch, 239; 1 Cond. Rep. 302. A certificated bankrupt or insolvent, discharged from the particular contract, need not be made a party to the bill on the contract. Van Reimsdyke v. Kane’s Ex’r, 1 Gall. C. C. R. 371. The power given to Congress to pass uniform laws, relative to bankruptcy, is exclusive of such power in the state governments; and this, whether the former has thought proper to exercise it or not. Golven v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313. A discharge from a debt under the bankrupt laws of the place of contract, is good in every other place where pleaded, as an extinguishment of the debt. But a like discharge where the contract is not made, has no effect. Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason’s C. C. R. 151. A debtor concealing himself from, and being denied to his creditors, does not constitute an act of bankruptcy under the laws of the United States; unless the service of process is thereby prevented. Barnes et al. v. Billington, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 29. If the debtor order himself to be denied to creditors and others, and is in consequence thereof denied to an officer, who comes to serve a process, it is an act of bankruptcy; provided the officer comes to serve the process, and not on other business: and the denial has taken place within six months of the issuing of the commission. Ibid. Giving a bond, with warrant to confess judgment to one creditor, upon the eve and in contemplation of bankruptcy, does not constitute a bankruptcy; unless the judgment entered on the bond, and the issuing of the execution was at the instance or by the procurement of the debtor. Such a bond would be a fraud on the general creditors. Ibid. Where two of three assignees of a bankrupt enter into an agreement in the absence of the third, the contract is not binding on the absent assignee; unless he had previously given authority to make it, or substantially recognize and acknowledge it. Aliter, among partners. Blight v. Ashley et al., 1 Peters’ C. C. R. 16. The agreement of the assignees of a bankrupt, to give a preference to a particular creditor, is not valid, without the assent of the commissioners, and a certain portion of the creditors. Ibid. Denial to an officer, whereby he is prevented serving process, must be really adversary, and not by concert between the creditor and the debtor, to bring about an act of bankruptcy. Ibid. No debt but such as is due and owing at the time of the bankruptcy, can be proved under the commission; and, consequently, an endorser or acceptor of a bill of exchange, drawn by the bankrupt, who was not paid it before the bankruptcy, cannot prove the debt. Mars et al. Assignees v. Barker et al., 1 Wash. C. C. R. 178. The acceptor or endorser of a bill of exchange, who pays the bill after the bankruptcy of the drawer, may offset the same against the bankrupt’s assignees; but he must show the debt to be a subsisting one in him, at the time the action was brought, for this is a case of mutual credit, given before the bankruptcy, although the money was not paid until after. Ibid. The district courts of the United States have not power, in bankrupt cases, to remove assignees, or compel them to account. Lucas v. Morris, Paine’s C. C. R. 396. The holder of the negotiable paper, payable “without defalcation,” under the laws of Pennsylvania, assigned after a commission of bankruptcy has issued, may come in under the commission; allowing all just offsets existing at the time of the bankruptcy, and which would have been admitted if the assignment had not been made. Humphreys v. Blight’s Assignees, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 44. The purchaser of a negotiable note, who becomes so after a commission of bankruptcy has issued, may prove under the commission; and he holds the note, subject to all legal offsets. Ibid. The 65th section of the bankrupt law of the United States, passed the 2d of March, 1799, does not repeal the provisions of the laws of the United States, which give to the surety who pays bonds for duties, a preference over other creditors. Mott v. The Assignees of Maris, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 196. The provisions of the bankrupt law except from its general operation, not only the preference of the United States, but also the right of preference for satisfaction of debts due to the United States. Ibid. P. paid a sum of money to the United States, as surety of S., in a bond for duties. S. became insolvent, and assigned his effects to Baker, who received four thousand dollars under the assignment, mixed the same with his own funds, and afterwards became bankrupt, and the defendants were appointed his assignees; but no effects, known to be part of the estate of S., came into their hands. The plaintiff claimed to have a preference and priority over the general creditors of Baker. By the court—Although the United States might, under the 65th section of the law to regulate the collection of duties, be entitled to claim of the defendants to the amount which came into the hands of B., as the assignees of S., the provisions of the law do not extend to the surety who has paid the bond, the same rights and privileges. Pollock v. Pratt & Harvey, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 490. A. H. devised an estate to C. S., for life; and after the death of C. S., he directed that the estate should be sold, and divided among the grandchildren of the testator, who should be living at the death of C. S. B. married one of the grandchildren, and, before the death of C. S., B. became bankrupt. B. and wife, after the decease of C. S., sold the property claimed under the will of A. H., and the plaintiff claimed and after the first day of June next, if any merchant, or other person, residing within the United States, actually using the trade of merchandise, by buying and selling in gross, or by retail, or dealing in exchange, or as a banker, broker, factor, underwriter, or marine insurer, shall,