Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 124.djvu/1340

 124 STAT. 1314 PUBLIC LAW 111–195—JULY 1, 2010 (B) Iran’s ongoing clandestine nuclear program, as evi- denced by its work on the secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, its subsequent refusal to cooperate fully with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its announcement that it would build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities. (C) Iran’s official notification to the International Atomic Energy Agency that it would enrich uranium to the 20 percent level, followed soon thereafter by its pro- viding to that Agency a laboratory result showing that Iran had indeed enriched some uranium to 19.8 percent. (D) A February 18, 2010, report by the International Atomic Energy Agency expressing ‘‘concerns about the pos- sible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activi- ties related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. These alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile related aspects, run by military-related organizations.’’. (E) A May 31, 2010, report by the International Atomic Energy Agency expressing continuing strong concerns about Iran’s lack of cooperation with the Agency’s verification efforts and Iran’s ongoing enrichment activities, which are contrary to the longstanding demands of the Agency and the United Nations Security Council. (F) Iran’s announcement in April 2010 that it had developed a new, faster generation of centrifuges for enriching uranium. (G) Iran’s ongoing arms exports to, and support for, terrorists in direct contravention of United Nations Secu- rity Council resolutions. (H) Iran’s July 31, 2009, arrest of 3 young citizens of the United States on spying charges. (8) There is an increasing interest by State governments, local governments, educational institutions, and private institu- tions, business firms, and other investors to disassociate them- selves from companies that conduct business activities in the energy sector of Iran, since such business activities may directly or indirectly support the efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. (9) Black market proliferation networks continue to flourish in the Middle East, allowing countries like Iran to gain access to sensitive dual-use technologies. (10) Economic sanctions imposed pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), and other authorities available to the United States to impose economic sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, are necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States. SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NEED TO IMPOSE ADDI- TIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN. It is the sense of Congress that— (1) international diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s illicit nuclear efforts and support for international terrorism are more likely to be effective if strong additional sanctions are imposed on the Government of Iran;