Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 121.djvu/357

 121 STAT. 336

PUBLIC LAW 110–53—AUG. 3, 2007 (B) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(2) AUTHORITY OF BOARD.—Upon receiving a congressional request described in section 703(b)(5), the Board may conduct the review and make the recommendations described in that section, regardless of whether such a review is requested by the President. ‘‘(3) REPORTING.—Any recommendations submitted to the President by the Board under section 703(b)(5), shall be submitted to the chairman and ranking minority member of the committee of Congress that made the request relating to such recommendations.’’; (3) in section 705(c), in the subsection heading, by striking ‘‘DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE’’ and inserting ‘‘DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE’’; and (4) in section 710(b), by striking ‘‘8 years after the date’’ and all that follows and inserting ‘‘on December 31, 2012.’’.

50 USC 435 note.

50 USC 435 note.

SEC. 603. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING A REPORT ON THE 9/ 11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REFORM.

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(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (referred to in this section as the ‘‘9/11 Commission’’) conducted a lengthy review of the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation. (2) In its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that— (A) congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States is dysfunctional; (B) under the rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives in effect at the time the report was completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence, and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges faced by the intelligence community of the United States; (C) as long as such oversight is governed by such rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the people of the United States will not get the security they want and need; (D) a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure is needed to give the intelligence community of the United States appropriate oversight, support, and leadership; and (E) the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its final report will not succeed if congressional oversight of the intelligence community in the United States is not changed. (3) The 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities. (4) Congress has enacted some of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

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