Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 118.djvu/692

 118 STAT. 662 PUBLIC LAW 108–237—JUNE 22, 2004 (4) Having the same technical standards used by Federal agencies and by the private sector permits the Government to avoid the cost of developing duplicative Government stand ards and to more readily use products and components designed for the commercial marketplace, thereby enhancing quality and safety and reducing costs. (5) Technical standards are written by hundreds of non profit voluntary consensus standards bodies in a nonexclu sionary fashion, using thousands of volunteers from the private and public sectors, and are developed under the standards development principles set out in Circular Number A–119, as revised February 18, 1998, of the Office of Management and Budget, including principles that require openness, balance, transparency, consensus, and due process. Such principles pro vide for— (A) notice to all parties known to be affected by the particular standards development activity, (B) the opportunity to participate in standards develop ment or modification, (C) balancing interests so that standards development activities are not dominated by any single group of interested persons, (D) readily available access to essential information regarding proposed and final standards, (E) the requirement that substantial agreement be reached on all material points after the consideration of all views and objections, and (F) the right to express a position, to have it considered, and to appeal an adverse decision. (6) There are tens of thousands of voluntary consensus standards available for government use. Most of these stand ards are kept current through interim amendments and interpretations, issuance of addenda, and periodic reaffirma tion, revision, or reissuance every 3 to 5 years. (7) Standards developed by government entities generally are not subject to challenge under the antitrust laws. (8) Private developers of the technical standards that are used as Government standards are often not similarly pro tected, leaving such developers vulnerable to being named as codefendants in lawsuits even though the likelihood of their being held liable is remote in most cases, and they generally have limited resources to defend themselves in such lawsuits. (9) Standards development organizations do not stand to benefit from any antitrust violations that might occur in the voluntary consensus standards development process. (10) As was the case with respect to research and produc tion joint ventures before the passage of the National Coopera tive Research and Production Act of 1993, if relief from the threat of liability under the antitrust laws is not granted to voluntary consensus standards bodies, both regarding the development of new standards and efforts to keep existing standards current, such bodies could be forced to cut back on standards development activities at great financial cost both to the Government and to the national economy.

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