Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 113 Part 1.djvu/807

 PUBLIC LAW 106-65—OCT. 5, 1999 113 STAT. 783 unless certain conditions were met, and the planning of a military operation to execute that ultimatum. (3) The political and military objectives of the United States and NATO in the conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (4) The military strategy of the United States and NATO to achieve those political and military objectives. (5) An analysis of the decisionmaking process of NATO and the effect of that decisionmaking process on the conduct of military operations. (6) An analysis of the decision not to include a ground component in Operation Allied Force (to include a detailed explanation of the political and military factors involved in that decision) and the effect of that decision on the conduct of military operations. (7) The deployment of United States forces and the transportation of supplies to the theater of operations, including an assessment of airlift and sealift, with a specific assessment of the deployment of Task Force Hawk. (8) The conduct of military operations, including a specific assessment of each of the following: (A) The effects of the graduated, incremental pace of the military operations. (B) The process for identifying, nominating, selecting and verifying targets to be attacked during Operation Allied Force, including an analysis of the factors leading to the bombing of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Belgrade. (C) The loss of aircraft and the accuracy of bombing operations. (D) The decoy and deception operations and counterintelligence techniques used by the Yugoslav military. (E) The use of high-demand, low-density assets in Operation Allied Force in terms of inventory, capabilities, deficiencies, and ability to provide logistical support. (F) A comparison of the military capabilities of the United States and of the allied participants in Operation Allied Force. (G) Communications and operational security of NATO forces. (H) The effect of adverse weather on the performance of weapons and supporting systems. (I) The decision not to use in the air campaign the Apache attack helicopters deployed as part of Task Force Hawk. (9) The conduct of relief operations by United States and allied military forces and the effect of those relief operations on military operations. (10) The ability of the United States during Operation Allied Force to conduct other operations required by the national defense strategy, including an analysis of the transfer of operational assets from other United States unified commands to the European Command for participation in Operation Allied Force and the effect of those transfers on the readiness, warfighting capability, and deterrence posture of those commands.

�