Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 112 Part 4.djvu/869

 '••i^i&ji!- PUBLIC LAW 105-277—OCT. 21, 1998 112 STAT. 2681-840 for membership in NATO as soon as they meet the criteria for such membership; (3) the United States should ensure that no hmitations are placed on the numbers of NATO troops or types of equipment, including tactical nuclear weapons, to be deployed on the territory of new member states; (4) the United States should reject all efforts to condition NATO decisions on review or approval by the United Nations Security Council; (5) the United States should clearly delineate those NATO deliberations, including but not limited t;o discussions on arms control, further Alliance enlargement, procurement matters, and strategic doctrine, that are not subjesct to review or discussion in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; (6) the United States should work to ensure that countries invited to join the Alliance are provided an immediate seat in NATO discussions; and (7) the United States already pays more than a proportionate share of the costs of the commion defense of Europe and should obtain, in advance, agreement on an equitable distribution of the cost of NATO enlargcjment to ensure that the United States does not continue to bear a disproportionate burden. (b) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA. — (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance's defensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United States and its NATO allies should make this intention clear in negotiations with Russia, including negotiations regarding adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 19, 1990. (2) LIMITATIONS ON COMMITMENTS TO RUSSIA.—In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive and security- enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments should be made to Russia that would have the effect of— (A) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including rights or responsibilities with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO members; (B) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction of defense infrastructui e or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinfor(2ements; (C) providing any intemationaJ organization, or any country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions, including dehberations and decisions with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to NATO;

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