Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 112 Part 3.djvu/343

 PUBLIC LAW 105-261—OCT. 17, 1998 112 STAT. 2173 nuclear systems and the potential of Russian superiority in tactical nuclear weapons to destabilize the overall nuclear balance as strategic nuclear weapons are sharply reduced under the START accords; (3) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of the warheads of those weapons, including an analysis of Russian coramand and control as it concerns the use of tactical nuclear weapons; (4) a summary of past, current, and planned efforts to work cooperatively with Russia to account for, secure, and reduce Russia's stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and associated fissile material; (5) a summary of how the United States would prevent, or plans to cope militarily with, scenarios in which a deterioration in relations with Moscow causes Russia to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or in which Russia threatens to employ, or actually employs, tactical nuclear weapons in a local or regional conflict involving the United States or allies of the United States; and (6) an assessment of the steps that could be taken by the United States to enhance military preparedness in order (A) to deter any potential attempt by Russia to possibly exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons through coercive "nuclear diplomacy" or on the battlefield, or (B) to counter Russia if Russia should make such an attempt to exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. (d) VIEWS. —The Secretary of Defense shall include in the report under subsection (c) the views of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the commander of the United States Strategic Command. Subtitle B—Satellite Export Controls SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 22 USC 2778 It is the sense of Congress that— (1) United States business interests must not be placed above United States national security interests; (2) United States foreign policy and the policies of the United States regarding commercial relations with other countries should affirm the importance of observing and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); (3) the United States should encourage universal observance of the Guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime; (4) the exportation or transfer of advanced communication satellites and related technologies from United States sources to foreign recipients should not increase the risks to the national security of the United States; (5) due to the military sensitivity of the technologies involved, it is in the national security interests of the United States that United States satellites and related items be subject to the same export controls that apply under United States law and practices to munitions; (6) the United States should not issue any blanket waiver of the suspensions contained in section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), regarding the export of satellites of United

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