Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 111 Part 2.djvu/874

 Ill STAT. 1954 PUBLIC LAW 105-85—NOV. 18, 1997 nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of stockpile stewardship, carried out at the nuclear weapons laboratories and nuclear weapons production plants. (3) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— It is the sense of Congress that— (A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital interests of the United States; (B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and (C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity. (c) ADDITION OF PRESIDENT TO RECIPIENTS OF REPORTS BY HEADS OF LABORATORIES AND PLANTS. —Section 3159(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended— (1) by striking out "committees and" and inserting in lieu thereof "committees,"; and (2) by inserting before the period at the end the following: ", and to the President". (d) TEN-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT.— Section 3159(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended by striking out "As soon as practicable" and inserting in lieu thereof "Not later than 10 days. (e) ADVICE AND OPINIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE. —In addition to a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons production plant (under section 3159 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o)), any member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council or the commander of the United States Strategic Command may also submit to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, or the congressional defense committees advice or opinion regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (f) EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL VIEWS.— A representative of the President may not take any action against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons production plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, or the Commander of United States Strategic Command for presenting individual views to the President, the National Security Council, or Congress regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (g) DEFINITIONS. —In this section: (1) The term "representative of the President" means the following: (A) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. (B) Any member of the National Security Council. (C) Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (D) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget,

�