Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 111 Part 2.djvu/863

 PUBLIC LAW 105-85—NOV. 18, 1997 111 STAT. 1943 agreement in principle on a number of far-reaching agreements, including START I, II, and III, a revision in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and a series of other agreements (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention), designed to further reduce bilateral threats and limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (3) These far-reaching agreements were based on the understanding between the United States and Russia that there would be a good faith effort on both sides to comply with the letter and spirit of the agreements. (4) Reports indicate that Russia has been pursuing construction of a massive underground facility of unknown purpose at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye (formerly the settlements of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16) that is designed to survive a nuclear war and appears to exceed reasonable defense requirements. (5) The Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to be consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness, and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War strategic partnership between the United States and Russia. (6) The United States has allowed senior Russian military and government officials to have access to key strategic facilities of the United States by providing tours of the North American Air Defense (NORAD) command at Cheyenne Mountain and the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, among other sites, and by providing extensive briefings on the operations of those facilities. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— It is the sense of Congress that the Russian government— (1) should provide to the United States Government a written explanation with sufficient detail (including drawings and diagrams) of the purpose and operational concept of the completed and planned facilities at Yamantau Mountain to support a high confidence judgment by the United States that the design of the Yamantau facility is consistent with official Russian government explanations; and (2) should allow a United States delegation, to include officials of the executive branch and Members of Congress, to have access to the Yamantau Mountain project and buildings and facilities surrounding the project. SEC. 1228. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN THREAT TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY. (a) FINDINGS. —Congress makes the following findings: (1) Cuba has maintained a hostile policy in its relations with the United States for over 35 years. (2) The United States, as a sovereign nation, must be able to respond to any Cuban provocation and defend the people and territory of the United States against any attack. (3) In 1994, the Government of Cuba callously encouraged a massive exodus of Cubans, by boat and raft, toward the United States during which countless numbers of those Cubans lost their lives on the high seas. (4) The humanitarian response of the United States to rescue, shelter, and provide emergency care to those Cubans,

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