Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 110 Part 1.djvu/252

 110 STAT. 228 PUBLIC LAW 104-106—FEB. 10, 1996 SEC. 227. DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM. (a) LIMITATION.— Not more than three percent of the total amount appropriated for research and development under the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance program pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations in section 201 may be obligated for systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA) contracts until— (1) funds are obligated (out of such appropriated funds) for— (A) the upgrade of U-2 aircraft senior year electrooptical reconnaissance sensors to the newest configuration; and (B) the upgrade of the U-2 SIGINT system; and (2) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology submits the report required under subsection (b). (b) REPORT ON U-2-RELATED UPGRADES.— (1) Not later than April 1, 1996, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology shall transmit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on obligations of funds for upgrades relating to airborne reconnaissance by U-2 aircraft. (2) The report shall set forth the specific purposes under the general purposes described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1) for which funds have been obligated (as of the date of the report) and the amounts that have been obligated (as of such date) for those specific purposes. Ballistic MissUe Defense Act of 1995 10 USC 2431 note. Subtitle C—Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the "Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995". SEC. 232. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The emerging threat that is posed to the national security interests of the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is significant and growing, both in terms of numbers of missiles and in terms of the technical capabilities of those missiles. (2) The deployment of ballistic missile defenses is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of a broader strategy to discourage both the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of the means of their delivery and to defend against the consequences of such proliferation. (3) The deployment of effective Theater Missile Defense systems can deter potential adversaries of the United States from escalating a conflict by threatening or attacking United States forces or the forces or territory of coalition partners or allies of the United States with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction to offset the operational and technical advantages of the United States and its coalition partners and allies. (4) United States intelligence officials have provided intelligence estimates to congressional committees that (A) the trend

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