Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 11.djvu/818

 774 APPENDIX. PROCLAMATION. N 0. 26. acknowledves that the law in question was passed xmder a power expressly 'ven by the Constitution to lay and collect imposts; but its constitutionality is giawu in question from the motives of those who passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case, nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law enacted under a. constitutional power, sha! make that law void; for how is that purpose to be ascertained? Who 1s_ to make the scrutiny? How often maybad purposes be falsely 1mputed———m how many cases are they concealed by false PPOfBSSi0DS—1D how many is no declaration of motive made ? Admit this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide, and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a. State may annul an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present case. The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This objection may be made with truth to every law that has been or can be passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that would operate with erfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconstitutionaii and if all laws of that description may be abrogated by any State for that cause, then indeed is the Federal Constitution unworthy of the slightest eifort for its preservation. We have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We have trusted to it as to the sheet anchor of our safety in the stormy times of conhiot with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred awe as the alladium ot our liberties, and, with all the solcmnities of religion, have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defence and support. Were we mistaken, W countrymen, in attaching this importance to the oustituiion of our country ? as our devotion paid to the wretched, ineiiicient, clumsy contrivance which this new doctrine would make it ? Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy not.hi€`ig—a bubble that must be blown away by the first breath of disaiiectiou ? as this selfidestroying, visionary theo? the work of the rofound statesmen, the exalted patriots, to whom the task o constitutional rgrm was entrusted ? Did the name of Washington sanction, did the States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the history of fimdameuta.1 legslation ? No. We were not mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical fault; its language directly contradicts the imputation; its s`t, its evident intent contradicts 1t. No, we did not errl Our Constitution dies not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The sages whose memory will always be reverenoed, have given us a. practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. The Father of his country did not affix his revered name to so palpable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a. veto on the laws of the United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by imfplicatiou. Search the debates in all their conventions,—examine the speeches o the most zealous opposers of Federal authority,—l0ok at the amendments that were proposed,—they are all silent, not a syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made, to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States, or to show that im lication, as is now contended, could defeat it. N0, we have not erred! The Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defence in danger, the source of our prospleirity in peace. It shall descend, as we have recexved it, uncorrupted by sotical construction, to our posterity; and the sacrifices of local interest, of gtate prejudices, of personal auimosities, that were made to bring it into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its su port. The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these Exws, are, that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed. The Constitution has given, expressly, to Congress, the right of raising revenue, and of determining the sum the public exngencies will require. The States have no control over the exercise of this right, other than that which results from the power of changing the representatives who abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may, undoubtedly, abuse this discretionary power, ut the same may be said of others with which they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution has `ven it to the re resentatives of all the people, checked by the representatives oglthe States andlby the executive power. The South Carolina construction gives it to the legislature or the