Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 11.djvu/816

 772 APPENDIX. PROCLAMATION. N0. 26. States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union—tha.t Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious inc1epende11ce,—thatsa.cred Union hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equalled in the history of nations,-—'I`o preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national honor and prosperity, and to jnstif the confidence my fellow-citizens have reposed in me, I, ANDREXV JACl2SON, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this my proclamation, stating my views of the Constitution an laws applicable to the measures adopted by the convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understandinv and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitahly result from an observance of the dictates of the convention. Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving the peace of the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothinv itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of the United: States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures while there is a hope that any thing will be yielded to reasoning and remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify a. full exposition to South Carolina and the nation, of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me t0_pursue. The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasihle right of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured ; but on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an act of Con ess void, but prohibit its execution-that they may do this consistentlywiththe (§;nstit11tion— that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its lace in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may cliyoose to consider as constitutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the Constitution; but 1t is evident, that to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufhcient check against the abuse of this power, it may be ashed why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by Congress? There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by Congress-one to the J udiciary, the other to the People, and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision in theory, and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is superfluous, when our social compact, in express terms declares, that the laws of the United States, its Constitution, and treaties made under it, are the su reme law of the land —and, for greater caution, adds “ that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."And it may be asserted without fear of refutation, that no Federative Government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional, and has a z-ight to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection in every other port, and no revenue could he collected any where; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat, that an unconstitutional law is no law, so lon as the question of its legality is to be decided by the State itself; for every lim operating injuriously upon any local interest, will be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal. If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved} in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non—intex·course law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunately, none of those States