Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 108 Part 1.djvu/504

 108 STAT. 478 PUBLIC LAW 103-236—APR. 30, 1994 (4) United States policy should ensure that North Korea does not possess a nuclear bomb or the capability to build one. (5) United States forces in Korea must remain vigilant and maintain a robust defense posture. (6) While diplomacy is the preferable method of dealing with the North i^rean nuclear challenge, all options, including the appropriate use of force, remain available. (7) In fashioning an appropriate policy for dealing with the challenge presented by North Korea's nuclear program, the Administration should consult closely with United States treaty allies, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as with China, Russia, and other members of the United Nations Security Council. (8) United States policy should support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as the international community's designated body for verifying compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to perform inspections of North Korea's nuclear program. (9) The United States should encourage strong and expeditious action by the United Nations Security Council inasmuch as North Korea has proved unwilling to comply fully with the following: (A) North Korea's December 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea pledging not to possess, manufacture, or use nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing facilities, and to negotiate the establishment of a nuclear inspection system. (B) The nuclear safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the IAEA on January 30, 1992. (C) The agreement on IAEA inspections North Korea accepted on February 15, 1994. (10) Unless North Korea imequivocally adheres to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and abides by all provisions of that treaty, the President should seek international consensus to isolate North Korea, including the imposition of sanctions, in an effort to persuade Pyongyang to halt its nuclear weapons program and permit IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. (11) Recognizing that within the international community China has significant influence over Pyongyang, the nature and extent of Chinese cooperation with the rest of the international community on the North Korean nuclear issue, including Chinese support for international sanctions should such sanctions be proposed and/or adopted, will inevitably be a significant factor in United States-China relations. (12) If unable to achieve an international consensus to isolate North Korea, the President should employ all unilateral means of leverage over North Korea, including, but not limited to, the prohibition of any transaction involving the commercial sale of any good or technology to North Korea. (13) The President should consult with United States allies in the region regarding the military posture of North Korea and the ability of the United States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack, or to defeat such an attack should it occur.

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