Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 107 Part 2.djvu/901

 PUBLIC LAW 103-160—NOV. 30, 1993 107 STAT. 1851 (d) REPORT. — Not later than June 1, 1994, the President shall President. submit to Congress a report on the status of efforts by the United States to secure the commitments and achieve the objective described in subsections (b) and (c). The President shall include in the report a discussion of the status of joint efforts by the United States and Russia to replace any remaining Russian plutonium production reactors with alternative power sources or to convert such reactors to operation with alternative fuels that would permit their operation without generating weapon-grade plutonium. SEC. 1613. NORTH KOREA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERA- TION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) FINDINGS. —The Congress finds the following: (1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. (2) Any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is obligated to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material that is within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control an3rwhere. (3) The International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted to conduct inspections in a nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty at any site, whether or not declared by that state, to ensure that all source or special fissionable material in that state is under safeguards. (4) North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear weapons state in December 1985. (5) North Korea, after acceding to that Treaty, refused until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as required under the Treaty. (6) Inspections of North Korea's nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency suggested discrepancies in North Korea's declarations regarding special nuclear materials. (7) North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory explanation for those discrepancies. (8) North Korea refused to provide International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors with full access to two sites for the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (9) When called upon by the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide such full access as required by the Treaty, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, effective after the required three months notice. (10) After intensive negotiations with the United States, North Korea agreed to suspend its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on providing access to its suspect sites. (11) In an attempt to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, the United States has offered to discuss with North Korea specific incentives that could be provided for North Korea once (A) outstanding inspection issues between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy

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