Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 107 Part 2.djvu/900

 107 STAT. 1850 PUBLIC LAW 103-160—NOV. 30, 1993 (A) addresses the implications of the adoption by the United States of a poUcy of no-first-iise of nuclear weapons; (B) addresses the implications of an agreement with the other nuclear weapons states to adopt such a policy; and (C) addresses the implications of a verifiable bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all nuclear weapons states this zero option for tactical nuclear weapons. (d) DEFINITIONS. —For purposes of this section: (1) The term "IAEA" means the International Atomic Energy Agency. (2) llie term "IAEA safeguards" means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article III(AX5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (3) The term "non-nuclear weapon state" means any country that is not a nuclear weapon state. (4) The term "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968. (5) The term "nuclear weapon state" means any country that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on Julv 1, 1968. (6) The term "weapons-usable fissile materials" means highly enriched uranium and separated or reprocessed plutonium. (7) The term "policy of no first use of nuclear weapons" means a commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. (8) The term "START II treaty" means the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January 3, 1993. 22 USC 5952 SEC. 1612. CONDITION ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA FOR CONSTRUC- note. TION OF PLUTONIUM STORAGE FACILITY. (a) LIMITATION. —Until a certification under subsection (b) is made, no funds may be obligated or expended by the United States for the purpose of assisting me Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia to construct a storage facility for surplus plutonium from dismantled weapons. (b) CERTIFICATION OF RUSSIA'S COMMITMENT TO HALT CHEMICAL SEPARATION OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM.— The prohibition in subsection (a) shall cease to apply upon a certification by the President to Congress that Russia— (1) is committed to halting the chemical separation of weapon-grade plutonium from spent nuclear fuel; and (2) is taking all practical steps to halt such separation at the earliestpossible date. (c) SENSE OF (JONGRESS ON PLUTONIUM POLICY. —It is the sense of Congress that a key objective of the United States with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should be to obtain a clear and unequivocal commitment from the Government of Russia that it will (1) cease all production and separation of weapongrade plutonium, and (2) halt chemical separation of plutonium produced in civil nuclear power reactors.

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