Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 1.djvu/470

 into, or residing within the same, shall, for himself or any other person whatsoever, either as master, factor or owner, build, fit, equip, load or otherwise prepare any ship or vessel, within any port or place of the said United States, nor shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from A foreign vessel engaged in the slave trade, captured on the high seas, in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and brought in for adjudication, will be restored, even where the vessel belongs to a nation which has prohibited the trade. Ibid.The right of visitation and search does not exist in time of peace. A vessel engaged in the slave trade in time of peace, even if belonging to a nation which has prohibited the trade, cannot, for that cause alone, be seized on the high seas, and brought in for adjudication in the courts of another country. But if the laws of that other country be violated, or the proceeding be authorized by treaty, the capture is not illegal. Ibid.Africans who are first captured by a belligerent privateer, fitted out in violation of our neutrality, or by a pirate, and then recaptured and brought into the ports of the United States, under a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the slave trade acts was intended, are not to be restored without full proof of the proprietary interests; for in such a case the capture is lawful. And whether in such a case restitution ought to be decreed or not, was a question on which the court was equally divided. Ibid.The District Courts have jurisdiction under the slave trade acts, to determine who are the actual captors, under a state law made in pursuance of the 4th section of the ; and directing the proceeds of the negroes to be paid, “one moiety for the use of the commanding officer of the capturing vessel,” &c. The Josefa Segunda, 10 Wheat. 312; 6 Cond. Rep. 111.Under the 7th section of the slave trade act of 1807, the entire proceeds of the vessel are forfeited to the use of the United States; unless the seizure be made by armed vessels of the navy, or by revenue cutters; in which case distribution is to be made in the same manner as prizes taken from the enemy. Ibid.Upon an indictment under the, against the owner of the ship, testimony of the declarations of the master, being a part of the res gestæ, connected with acts in furtherance of the voyage and within the scope of his authority as the agent of the owner, in the conduct of the guilty enterprise, is admissible. Upon such an indictment against the owner, charging him with fitting out the ship, with an intent to employ her in the illegal voyage, evidence is admissible that her commander authorized, and directed the fitment through the instrumentality of his agent, without being personally present. The United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460; 6 Cond. Rep. 572.It is not essential to constitute the fitting out, under the acts of Congress, that every equipment necessary for a slave voyage, or any equipment peculiarly adapted to such a voyage, should be taken on board. It is sufficient if the vessel is actually fitted out with intent to be employed in the illegal voyage. The offence may be laid in the words of the statute. Ibid.Nor is it necessary that there should be some principal offender, to whom the defendant might be aiding and abetting. Those terms in the statute do not refer to the relation of principal and accessory in cases of felony, but to the actor; and they who aid and abet the act, are considered as principals. The offence must be alleged to have been committed within the United States. Ibid.Under the act of March 22, 1794, prohibiting the slave trade, if the original object and equipment of the voyage from the United States, was to carry on the African slave trade, the forfeiture attaches, whether the vessel was then owned by American citizens or by foreigners. It is equally unimportant if the act was done by the party,, or for the benefit of another. The Margaret, 9 Wheat. 421; 5 Cond. Rep. 638.Even if the equipments are innocent, and adapted to ordinary voyages, if there is positive proof of a guilty intention, forfeiture will attach. Nor is it necessary that the equipments shall have been completed. It is sufficient if any preparations have been made for the unlawful voyage. Ibid.Under the 2d and 3d sections of the, the offence of sailing from a port to engage in the slave trade, is not committed unless the vessel sails out of the port. United States v. La Coste, 2 Mason’s C. C. R. 129.If a foreign claimant of a vessel seized for being engaged in the slave trade, sets up a title derived from an American owner, he must prove affirmatively that the case has no admixture of American ownership. United States v. La Jeune Eugenia, 2 Mason’s C. C. R. 409.The 1st section of the, prohibits not only the transportation of slaves, but the being employed on the business of the slave trade; and therefore a vessel caught in such trade, though before she has taken on board any slaves, is liable to forfeiture. The Alexander, 3 Mason’s C. C. R. 175.The offence against the law of the United States, under the 7th section of the, is not that of importing or bringing into the United States persons of colour, with intent to hold or sell those persons as slaves, but that of hovering on the coast of the United States with such intent; and although it forfeits the vessel and any goods or effects found on board, it is silent as to disposing of any persons found on board, any further than to impose a duty upon the officers of any armed vessels, who make the capture, to keep them safely, to be delivered to the overseers of the poor, or to the governor of the state, or persons appointed by the respective states to receive them. United States v. Preston, 3 Peters, 65.Certain persons who were slaves in Louisiana, were, by their owners, taken to France as servants, and after some time, they, by their own consent, were sent back to Louisiana. The ships in which these persons were passengers, were, after the arrival of the vessels in the United States, libelled for alleged breaches of the, prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States. Held that the provisions of the act of Congress do not apply to such cases. The United States v. Garonne, 11 Peters, 73.The act of March 22, 1794, was intended to prohibit any citizen or resident of the United States from equipping vessels within the United States, carrying on trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country. The Tryphemea, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 522.The act of May 10, 1800, extends the prohibitions to citizens of the United States, in any manner