Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/412

 546US1

Unit: $U16

[08-22-08 15:44:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 189 (2006)

201

Opinion of the Court

Chavis concedes, however, that in March 1996, App. 38, about a year and a half after the California Court of Appeal denied his habeas petition, he was given a new prison job. He nowhere denies California’s assertion, id., at 68, that this new job’s working hours permitted him to use the library. And he also concedes that the prison “remained relatively lockdown free” between February 1997 and August 1997, id., at 39, a 6-month period. Thus, viewing every disputed issue most favorably to Chavis, there remains a totally unex­ plained, hence unjustiﬁed, delay of at least six months. Six months is far longer than the “short period[s] of time,” 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for ﬁling an appeal to the state supreme court. Saffold, supra, at 219. It is far longer than the 10-day period California gives a losing party to ﬁle a notice of appeal in the California Supreme Court, see Cal. App. Ct. Rule 28(e)(1) (2004). We have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that California would consider an unjustiﬁed or un­ explained 6-month ﬁling delay “reasonable.” Nor do we see how an unexplained delay of this magnitude could fall within the scope of the federal statutory word “pending” as inter­ preted in Saffold. See 536 U. S., at 222–223. Thus, since Chavis needs all but two days of the lengthy (three year and one month) delay to survive the federal 1-year habeas ﬁling period, see 382 F. 3d, at 927, he cannot succeed. The concurrence reaches the same ultimate conclusion in a different way. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, it would not count in Chavis’ favor certain days during which Chavis was pursuing a second round of state collateral review efforts. See post, at 210. Because, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the parties did not argue this particular matter below, 382 F. 3d, at 925, n. 3, we do not consider it here. For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.