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[08-22-08 15:44:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 189 (2006)

199

Opinion of the Court

Some of these cases will involve ﬁling delays, and some of those delays will require the federal courts to determine whether a petition for appellate review in a related state collateral proceeding was timely. Given the uncertain scope of California’s “reasonable time” standard, it may not be easy for the Circuit to decide in each such case whether the pris­ oner’s state-court review petition was timely. And it is con­ sequently not surprising that the Circuit has tried to create rules of thumb that look to the label the California Supreme Court applied to the denial order, even where that label does not refer to timeliness. For the reasons we gave in Saffold, however, we do not believe these shortcuts remain true, either to California’s timeliness rule or to Congress’ intent in AEDPA to toll the 1-year limitations period only when the state collateral review proceeding is “pending.” 536 U. S., at 220–221, 225–226. The California courts themselves might alleviate the prob­ lem by clarifying the scope of the words “reasonable time” in this context or by indicating, when denying a petition, whether the ﬁling was timely. And the Ninth Circuit might seek guidance on the matter by certifying a question to the California Supreme Court in an appropriate case. Id., at 226–227. Alternatively, the California Legislature might it­ self decide to impose more determinate time limits, conform­ ing California law in this respect with the law of most other States. Indeed, either state body might adopt a state-law presumption of the kind the concurrence here suggests. See post, at 209. In the absence of any such guidance, however, we see no alternative way of applying state law to a case like this one but for the Ninth Circuit simply to ask and to decide whether the state prisoner made the relevant ﬁling within a reasonable time. In doing so, the Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely ﬁlings in Cali­ fornia (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that California law in this respect did not