Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/408

 546US1

Unit: $U16

[08-22-08 15:44:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 189 (2006)

197

Opinion of the Court

III

A

California argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case is inconsistent with our decision in Saffold. Like Cali­ fornia, we do not see how it is possible to reconcile the two cases. In Saffold, we held that (1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period for the time between the lower court’s adverse decision and the ﬁling of a notice of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, “unreasonable” delays are not timely; and (3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order denying a petition “on the merits” does not automatically indicate that the petition was timely ﬁled. In addition, we referred to a Ninth Circuit case holding that a 4-year delay was reasonable as an example of what the law forbids the Ninth Circuit to do. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in this case said in effect that the California Supreme Court’s denial of a petition “on the merits” did automatically mean that the petition was timely (and thus that a 3-year delay was reasonable). More than that, it treated an order from the California Supreme Court that was silent on the grounds for the court’s decision as if it were equivalent to an order in which the words “on the merits” appeared. 382 F. 3d, at 926. If the appearance of the words “on the merits” does not automatically warrant a holding that the ﬁling was timely, the absence of those words could not automatically warrant a holding that the ﬁl­ ing was timely. After all, the fact that the California Su­ preme Court did not include the words “on the merits” in its order denying Chavis relief makes it less likely, not more likely, that the California Supreme Court believed that Chavis’ 3-year delay was reasonable. Thus, the Ninth Cir­ cuit’s presumption (“that an order decided entirely on the merits indicates that the state court did not ﬁnd the petition