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OCTOBER TERM, 2005

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Syllabus

EVANS, ACTING WARDEN v. CHAVIS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 04–721. Argued November 9, 2005—Decided January 10, 2006 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) gives a state prisoner whose conviction has become ﬁnal one year to seek federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), but tolls this 1-year limitations period for the “time during which a properly ﬁled application for State. . . collateral review. . . is pending,” § 2244(d)(2). Under California’s collateral review scheme, the equivalent of a notice of appeal is timely if ﬁled within a “reasonable time.” In Carey v. Saf­ fold, 536 U. S. 214, this Court held, inter alia, that (1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s limitations period for the time between the lower court’s adverse decision and the ﬁling of a notice of appeal; (2) in Califor­ nia, “unreasonable” delays are not timely; and (most pertinently) (3) a California Supreme Court order denying a petition “on the merits” does not automatically indicate that the petition was timely ﬁled. Respondent Chavis, a California state prisoner, ﬁled a state habeas petition on May 14, 1993, which the trial court denied. On September 29, 1994, the California Court of Appeal also held against him. He then waited more than three years before seeking review in the California Supreme Court. On April 29, 1998, that court issued an order stating simply that the petition was denied. On August 30, 2000, Chavis ﬁled a federal habeas petition. After the case reached it, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal petition’s timeliness depended on whether Chavis’ state postconviction relief application was “pending,” therefore tolling AEDPA’s limitations period, during the 3-year period between the time the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion and the time he sought review in the State Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit held that the state application was “pending” because under Circuit prece­ dent a denial without comment or citation is treated as a denial on the merits, and a petition denied on the merits was not untimely. Held: The Ninth Circuit departed from Saffold’s interpretation of AEDPA as applied to California’s system. Pp. 197–201. (a) Contrary to Saffold, the Circuit in this case said in effect that the California Supreme Court’s denial of a petition “on the merits” did automatically mean that the petition was timely. More than that, it treated a State Supreme Court order that was silent on the grounds for