Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/396

 546US1

Unit: $U15

[08-22-08 15:43:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 164 (2006)

185

Stevens, J., dissenting

II For decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite injury to competition under the Robinson-Patman Act from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to its competitors. This rule dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury in Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948): “It is argued that the ﬁndings fail to show that respond­ ent’s discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition. There are speciﬁc ﬁndings that such injuries had resulted from respondent’s discounts, al­ though the statute does not require the Commission to ﬁnd that injury has actually resulted. The statute re­ quires no more than that the effect of the prohibited price discriminations ‘may be substantially to lessen competition. . . or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi­ tion.’ After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have said that ‘the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a rea­ sonable possibility that they “may” have such an effect.’ Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 742. Here the Commission found what would ap­ pear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The ﬁndings are adequate.” Id., at 45–47 (footnote omitted). We have treated as competitors those who sell “in a single, interstate retail market.” Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 436 (1983); cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S. 320, 327 (1961). Under this approach—uncontroversial until today—Reeder