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MARTIN v. FRANKLIN CAPITAL CORP. Opinion of the Court

jectives’ of the relevant Act, which embrace certain ‘equita­ ble considerations.’ ” Id., at 759 (citation omitted).* By enacting the removal statute, Congress granted a right to a federal forum to a limited class of state-court defend­ ants. If fee shifting were automatic, defendants might choose to exercise this right only in cases where the right to remove was obvious. See Christiansburg Garment, supra, at 422 (awarding fees simply because the party did not pre­ vail “could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a [party] be sure of ultimate success”). But there is no reason to suppose Congress meant to confer a right to remove, while at the same time discouraging its ex­ ercise in all but obvious cases. Congress, however, would not have enacted § 1447(c) if its only concern were avoiding deterrence of proper removals. Instead, Congress thought fee shifting appropriate in some cases. The process of removing a case to federal court and then having it remanded back to state court delays resolu­ tion of the case, imposes additional costs on both parties, and wastes judicial resources. Assessing costs and fees on remand reduces the attractiveness of removal as a method for delaying litigation and imposing costs on the plaintiff. The appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter removals sought for the pur­ pose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the oppos­ ing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria are satisﬁed. standard under which fees should be awarded. But that decision did not depart from Zipes because we granted certiorari to decide only whether the same standard applied to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defend­ ants. See 510 U. S., at 521. Having decided this question and rejected the claim that fee shifting should be automatic, we remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the appropriate test in the ﬁrst instance. Id., at 534–535.
 * In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517 (1994), we did not identify a