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Cite as: 546 U. S. 132 (2005)

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Syllabus wise warranted. Were the statute strictly jurisdictional, there would be no need to limit awards to “just” costs; any award authorized by other provisions of law would presumably be “just.” The Court there­ fore gives the statute its natural reading: Section 1447(c) authorizes courts to award costs and fees, but only when such an award is just. That standard need not be deﬁned narrowly, as the Solicitor General argues, by awarding fees only on a showing that the unsuccessful party’s position was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Chris­ tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 422, and Flight Attend­ ants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 762, distinguished. The fact that a § 1447(c) fee award is discretionary does not mean that there is no governing legal standard. When applying fee-shifting statutes, the Court has found limits in “ ‘the large objectives’ ” of the relevant Act. E. g., id., at 759. The appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize Congress’ desire to deter removals intended to prolong litiga­ tion and impose costs on the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria are satisﬁed. In light of these “ ‘large objectives,’ ” the standard for awarding fees should turn on the reasonableness of the removal. In applying the general rule of reasonableness, district courts retain discretion to consider whether unusual circumstances warrant a departure in a given case. A court’s reasons for departing, however, should be “faithful to the purposes” of awarding fees under § 1447(c). Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517, 534, n. 19. Pp. 136–141. 393 F. 3d 1143, afﬁrmed. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Sam Heldman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Hilary E. Ball, Michael P. Malakoff, and James M. Pietz. Jan T. Chilton argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Ronald J. Segel.* States by Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, James A. Feldman, Michael Jay Singer, and Michael E. Robinson; and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Robert N. Weiner and Robert D. Rosenbaum.
 * Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the United