Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/290

 546US1

Unit: $$U9

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Cite as: 546 U. S. 74 (2005)

79

Per Curiam

II The Sixth Circuit also held that respondent was entitled to relief on the ground that the state courts’ denial of his Strickland claim was unreasonable. 395 F. 3d, at 688. As petitioner contends, the Sixth Circuit erred in its adjudica­ tion of this claim by relying on evidence that was not prop­ erly presented to the state habeas courts without ﬁrst de­ termining (1) whether respondent was at fault for failing to develop the factual bases for his claims in state court, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 430–432 (2000), or (2) whether respondent satisﬁed the criteria established by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2). See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649, 653 (2004) (per curiam). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit erred by disregarding the state habeas courts’ conclusion that the forensic expert whom respondent’s trial counsel hired was a “properly qualiﬁed expert,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 347a, without analyzing whether the state court’s factual ﬁnding had been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(1). Compare App. to Pet. for Cert. 347a with 395 F. 3d, at 683. In addition, as petitioner contends, the Sixth Circuit erred in relying on certain grounds that were apparent from the trial record but not raised on direct appeal—namely, that trial counsel (1) inadequately cross­ examined experts called by the State, (2) erred by prema­ turely placing the forensic expert counsel had hired on the witness list, and (3) failed to present competing scientiﬁc evi­ dence against the State’s forensic experts—without ﬁrst de­ termining whether respondent’s procedural default of these subclaims could be excused by a showing of cause and preju­ dice or by the need to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 340a–341a, 351a–354a (state courts’ holding that these subclaims should have been raised on di­ rect appeal); id., at 109a–110a (District Court’s holding that this default was not excusable under Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 749–750 (1991)). Respondent, however, con­ tends that the State failed to preserve its objection to the