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 546US1

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SCHAFFER v. WEAST Stevens, J., concurring

today. Justice Breyer contends that the allocation of the burden ought to be left entirely up to the States. But nei­ ther party made this argument before this Court or the courts below. We therefore decline to address it. We hold no more than we must to resolve the case at hand: The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case, that party is Brian, as represented by his parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in turn bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is, therefore, afﬁrmed. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice Stevens, concurring. It is common ground that no single principle or rule solves all cases by setting forth a general test for ascertaining the incidence of proof burdens when both a statute and its legis­ lative history are silent on the question. See Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461, 494, n. 17 (2004); see also ante, at 57; post, at 63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I do not understand the majority to disagree with the proposition that a court, taking into ac­ count “ ‘policy considerations, convenience, and fairness,’ ” post, at 63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), could conclude that the purpose of a statute is best effectuated by placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Moreover, I agree with much of what Justice Ginsburg has written about the spe­ cial aspects of this statute. I have, however, decided to join the Court’s disposition of this case, not only for the reasons set forth in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, but also because I believe that we should presume that public school ofﬁcials