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Unit: $$U5

[08-22-08 13:38:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

IBP, INC. v. ALVAREZ Opinion of the Court

unrecorded work covered by the FLSA. Speciﬁcally, they claimed that Barber ’s failure to compensate them for (a) donning and dofﬁng required protective gear and (b) the attendant walking and waiting violated the statute. After extensive discovery, the Magistrate Judge issued a comprehensive opinion analyzing the facts in detail, and rec­ ommending the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Barber. That opinion, which was later adopted by the District Court for Maine, included two critical rulings. First, the Magistrate Judge held that “the donning and dofﬁng of clothing and equipment required by the defendant or by government regulation, as opposed to clothing and equipment which employees choose to wear or use at their option, is an integral part of the plaintiffs’ work [and there­ fore are] not excluded from compensation under the Portal­ to-Portal Act as preliminary or postliminary activities.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04–66, pp. 36a–40a. Second, the Magistrate Judge rejected petitioners’ claims for “compensation for the time spent before obtaining their clothing and equipment.” Id., at 33a. Such time, in the Magistrate Judge’s view, “could [not] reasonably be con­ strued to be an integral part of employees’ work activities any more than walking to the cage from which hairnets and earplugs are dispensed. . . .” Ibid. Accordingly, Barber was “entitled to summary judgment on any claims based on time spent walking from the plant entrances to an employ­ ee’s workstation, locker, time clock or site where clothing and equipment required to be worn on the job is to be ob­ tained and any claims based on time spent waiting to punch in or out for such clothing or equipment.” Id., at 33a–34a. The Magistrate Judge’s opinion did not speciﬁcally address the question whether the walking time between the produc­ tion line and the place of donning and dofﬁng was encom­ passed by § 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, and thus excluded from coverage under the FLSA. Whatever the intended scope of the Magistrate’s grant of partial summary judg­