Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/239

 546US1

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Unit: $$U5

[08-22-08 13:38:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

IBP, INC. v. ALVAREZ Opinion of the Court

“which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subse­ quent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.” 61 Stat. 86–87 (codiﬁed at 29 U. S. C. § 254(a)). Other than its express exceptions for travel to and from the location of the employee’s “principal activity,” and for activities that are preliminary or postliminary to that princi­ pal activity, the Portal-to-Portal Act does not purport to change this Court’s earlier descriptions of the terms “work” and “workweek,” or to deﬁne the term “workday.” A regu­ lation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor shortly after its enactment concluded that the statute had no effect on the computation of hours that are worked “within” the workday. That regulation states: “[T]o the extent that activities en­ gaged in by an employee occur after the employee com­ mences to perform the ﬁrst principal activity on a particular workday and before he ceases the performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of [§ 4] have no application.” 29 CFR § 790.6(a) (2005).3 Simi­ 3

The regulation provides in full: “Section 4 of the Portal Act does not affect the computation of hours worked within the ‘workday’ proper, roughly described as the period ‘from whistle to whistle,’ and its provisions have nothing to do with the compen­ sability under the Fair Labor Standards Act of any activities engaged in by an employee during that period. Under the provisions of section 4, one of the conditions that must be present before ‘preliminary’ or ‘postlimi­ nary’ activities are excluded from hours worked is that they ‘occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which the employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases’ the principal activity or activities which he is employed to per­ form. Accordingly, to the extent that activities engaged in by an em­ ployee occur after the employee commences to perform the ﬁrst principal activity on a particular workday and before he ceases the performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of that section have no application. Periods of time between the commencement of the employee’s ﬁrst principal activity and the completion of his last principal activity on any workday must be included in the computation of