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EBERHART v. UNITED STATES Per Curiam

attributing it directly or indirectly to Robinson. See, e. g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 247 (1998); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 203 (1988); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam); Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264, 271–272 (1978). But see Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 269 (1988) (reversing an order dismissing an appeal as jurisdictionally out of time when “[n]either the District Court nor respondent suggested that the notice of appeal might be untimely”); Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 386 (1964) (per curiam) (permitting appeal, when petitioner conceded that post-trial motions were served late, in part because petitioner “relied on the Government’s failure to raise a claim of untimeliness when the motions were ﬁled”). As we recognized in Kontrick, courts “have more than oc­ casionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court.” 540 U. S., at 454. See also ibid. (citing Robinson as an example of when we have been “less than meticulous” in our use of the word “jurisdic­ tional”). The resulting imprecision has obscured the central point of the Robinson case—that when the Government objected to a ﬁling untimely under Rule 37, the court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was mandatory. The net effect of Robinson, viewed through the clarifying lens of Kontrick, is to admonish the Government that failure to object to un­ timely submissions entails forfeiture of the objection, and to admonish defendants that timeliness is of the essence, since the Government is unlikely to miss timeliness defects very often. Our more recent cases have done much to clarify this point. For instance, in Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416 (1996), we held that a court may not grant a postverdict motion for a judgment of acquittal that is untimely under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) when the prosecu­ tor objects. As we pointedly noted in Kontrick, our holding in Carlisle did not “characterize [Rule 29] as ‘jurisdic­