Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/228

 546US1

Unit: $$U4

[08-22-08 13:34:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 12 (2005)

17

Per Curiam

it within constant time periods,” id., at 473–474, n. 2, that observation hardly transforms the Rules into the keys to the kingdom of subject-matter jurisdiction. Rather, as we emphasized in the text, the District Judge could not use Rule 33 to sidestep a pre-existing basic principle of judicial process—that once a ﬁnal judgment is issued and the court of appeals considers a case, a district court has no power to act on it further. This was a consequence, however, not of the Rule, but of the Rule’s failure to alter prior law. Smith does not address the effect of untimely arguments in support of a motion for new trial when, as here, the district court is still considering post-trial motions and the case has not yet been appealed. Nor does Robinson address that circumstance. Defend­ ants were 11 days late in ﬁling their notices of appeal under (what was then) Rule 37. The Government responded not by contesting the merits of the appeal, but by moving to dismiss on the basis of untimeliness. 361 U. S., at 221. The Court of Appeals determined that if the District Court found that the untimely notices of appeal sprang from “excusable neglect,” it could allow the appeals. On remand, the Dis­ trict Court so found. Id., at 222. We held that the Court of Appeals was wrong in having failed to dismiss under Rule 45(b). Id., at 229–230. Robinson is correct not because the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but be­ cause district courts must observe the clear limits of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when they are properly in­ voked. This does not mean that limits like those in Rule 33 are not forfeitable when they are not properly invoked. Despite its narrow and unremarkable holding, Robinson has created some confusion because of its observation that “courts have uniformly held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdic­ tional.” Id., at 229 (emphasis added). Indeed, we used the phrase “mandatory and jurisdictional” four times in the opin­ ion. And subsequent opinions have repeated this phrase,