Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/926

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ORDERS 1017

1019

Blackmun, J., dissenting

Id., at 258–259, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). In short, the adequacy of the legally admitted evidence is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the influence that the error had upon the jury. See, e. g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 297–300 (1991) (focusing on the contribution of the coerced confession); Satterwhite, 486 U. S., at 259–260 (focusing on the contribution of testimony on future dangerousness). In my view, the Court of Appeals misapplied harmless-error analysis in two respects. First, it gave only cursory consideration to how the error contributed to the verdict, summarily stating that Warren’s testimony, “though undoubtedly helpful to the prosecution because he was a charged co-conspirator, was to a large extent either cumulative or generally corroborated by other testimony.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 13. Rather, the Court of Appeals relied on its conclusion that the legally admitted evidence was “obviously sufficient to convict if believed.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals’ focus on the adequacy of the legally admitted evidence was error. The Court of Appeals then compounded this error by considering the legally admitted evidence “in the light most favorable to the government.” Id., at 12. We have consistently held since Chapman that constitutional error “casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless.” 386 U. S., at 24. See also Fulminante, 499 U. S., at 296 (prosecution has burden of demonstrating that admission of confession did not contribute to conviction); Satterwhite, 486 U. S., at 258–259. The Court of Appeals’ review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government improperly shifted the burden to Smith. In sum, focusing on the legally admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the Government “preserves” the factfinder’s weighing of the evidence. Such preservation is desirable when the reviewing court is examining the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (1979). Once the reviewing court has identified a constitutional error, however, it should not preserve the factfinder’s tainted deliberation—it should dissect it. The reviewing court then must require “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman, 386 U. S., at 24. Because the Court