Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/551

 502us2$26D 01-22-99 08:32:58 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 502 U. S. 367 (1992)

393

O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment

tional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately considered in tailoring a consent decree modification. IV To conclude, we hold that the Swift “grievous wrong” standard does not apply to requests to modify consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation. Under the flexible standard we adopt today, a party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. We vacate the decision below and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment. I agree that these cases should be remanded so that the District Court may reconsider whether to modify the decree. I write separately to emphasize the limited nature of our review; to clarify why, despite our limited review, the cases should be returned to the District Court; and to explain my concerns with certain portions of the Court’s opinion. I A court may modify a final judgment, such as the judgment embodied in the consent decree at issue, where the court finds that “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(5). Determining what is “equitable” is necessarily a task that entails substantial discretion, particularly in a case like this one, where the District Court must make complex decisions requiring the sensitive balancing of a host of fac-