Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/469

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Cite as: 502 U. S. 301 (1992)

311

Opinion of the Court

States shall not be liable for any claim based on “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee of the Government.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a). It would have made little sense to try to incorporate commonlaw standards in explicating terms like “discretionary function” in the absence of any evidence that such concepts had any basis in the common law of most States or had been given some widely shared meaning. In marked contrast, the concept of “punitive damages” is deeply rooted in the common law. An examination of the nature of the exceptions in § 2680 further demonstrates that those limitations serve a qualitatively different purpose than § 2674’s bar on “punitive damages.” The § 2680 exceptions are designed to protect certain important governmental functions and prerogatives from disruption. They mark “the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.” United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S. 797, 808 (1984). Through the § 2680 exceptions, “Congress has taken steps to protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations.” United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S., at 163. See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 322–323 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U. S. 531, 536–537 (1988). For example, there are exceptions for claims involving the mishandling of mail, § 2680(b), the assessment or collection of taxes or customs duties, § 2680(c), the imposition or establishment of a quarantine, § 2680(f), damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by regulation of the monetary system, § 2680(i), the combatant activities of the military, § 2680( j), the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Panama Canal Company, §§ 2680(l), (m), and the activities of federal land banks, § 2680(n). These examples suggest that Congress’