Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/464

 502us2$23Z 08-19-96 17:41:21 PAGES OPINPGT

306

MOLZOF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court

also id., at 12. We understand petitioner to be suggesting that the Court define the term “punitive damages” by reference to traditional common law, leaving plaintiffs free to recover any damages that cannot be characterized as “punitive” under that standard. The Government, on the other hand, suggests that we define “punitive damages” as “damages that are in excess of, or bear no relation to, compensation.” Brief for United States 5. In the Government’s view, there is a strict dichotomy between compensatory and punitive damages; damages that are not strictly compensatory are necessarily “punitive damages” barred by the statute. Thus, the Government contends that any damages other than those awarded for a plaintiff ’s actual loss—which the Government narrowly construes to exclude damages that are excessive, duplicative, or for an inherently noncompensable loss, id., at 22—are “punitive damages” because they are punitive in effect. We agree with petitioner’s interpretation of the term “punitive damages,” and conclude that the Government’s reading of § 2674 is contrary to the statutory language. Section 2674 prohibits awards of “punitive damages,” not “damages awards that may have a punitive effect.” “Punitive damages” is a legal term of art that has a widely accepted common-law meaning; “[p]unitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 255 (1984). Although the precise nature and use of punitive damages may have evolved over time, and the size and frequency of such awards may have increased, this Court’s decisions make clear that the concept of “punitive damages” has a long pedigree in the law. “It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.” Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852). See