Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/463

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Cite as: 502 U. S. 301 (1992)

305

Opinion of the Court

gress. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 24–25 (1953). The FTCA replaced that “notoriously clumsy,” id., at 25, system of compensation with a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity. United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807, 813 (1976). In this case, we must determine the scope of that waiver as it relates to awards of “punitive damages” against the United States. The FTCA provides in pertinent part as follows: “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 28 U. S. C. § 2674 (emphasis added). As this provision makes clear, in conjunction with the jurisdictional grant over FTCA cases in 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), the extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA is generally determined by reference to state law. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 153 (1963); Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 6–7, 11 (1962); Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 318–319 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 64–65, 68–69 (1955); United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 370 (1949). Nevertheless, the meaning of the term “punitive damages” as used in § 2674, a federal statute, is by definition a federal question. Cf. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U. S. 204, 208 (1946) (definition of “real property” as used in a federal statute is a federal question). Petitioner argues that “§ 2674 must be interpreted so as to permit awards against the United States of those state-law damages which are intended by state law to act as compensation for injuries sustained as a result of the tort, and to preclude awards of damages which are intended to act as punishment for egregious conduct.” Brief for Petitioner 8; see