Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/454

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NORMAN v. REED Scalia, J., dissenting

We decline to consider whether that ruling was constitutional. The Supreme Court of Illinois itself did not address it and therefore did not decide whether, under Illinois law, the Party’s omission of judicial candidates doomed the entire slate.11 We therefore remand these cases to that court for its prompt resolution of this issue. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 277 (1984); see also McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 454 U. S. 1071, 1073–1074 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).12 The judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Justice Scalia, dissenting. In the absence of an opinion by the Illinois Supreme Court defending its own judgment, and lacking any clear alternative analysis presented by respondents, the Court accepts petitioners’ characterization of these cases as involving 11 Among other possibilities, the Supreme Court of Illinois might agree with the Board’s conclusion that the judgeships at issue are not offices of the same “political subdivision” as nonjudicial offices within Cook County. That court might also construe the decision in Anderson v. Schneider, 67 Ill. 2d 165, 365 N. E. 2d 900 (1977), to hold that an omission of judicial candidates should not invalidate the rest of the slate. 12 To restate our conclusion, any rule, whether or not denominated the “complete slate” requirement, see, e. g., post, at 298, 299 (dissenting opinion’s use of the term in this context); App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 90–1435, pp. 23a–24a (Circuit Court’s use of the term in this context), that disqualifies petitioners’ entire slate for failure to collect 25,000 signatures wholly from the suburban district would be unconstitutional for the reasons given in Part III–B above. We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of a “complete slate requirement” that would invalidate petitioners’ slate for their failure to field judicial candidates.