Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/386

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HUNTER v. BRYANT Per Curiam

from its statement that “[w]hether a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment. . . based on lack of probable cause is proper only if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach.” 903 F. 2d, at 721. This statement of law is wrong for two reasons. First, it routinely places the question of immunity in the hands of the jury. Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial. See Mitchell, supra, at 527–529. Second, the court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed five years after the fact. Under settled law, Secret Service Agents Hunter and Jordan are entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Bryant. Probable cause existed if “at the moment the arrest was made. . . the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing” that Bryant had violated 18 U. S. C. § 871. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964). When Agents Hunter and Jordan arrested Bryant, they possessed trustworthy information that Bryant had written a letter containing references to an assassination scheme directed against the President, that Bryant was cognizant of the President’s whereabouts, that Bryant had made an oral statement that “ ‘[h]e should have been assassinated in Bonn,’ ” 903 F. 2d, at 719, and that Bryant refused to answer questions about whether he intended to harm the President. On the basis of this information, a Magistrate ordered Bryant to be held without bond. These undisputed facts establish that the Secret Service agents are entitled to qualified immunity. Even if we assumed, arguendo, that they (and the magistrate) erred in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Bryant, the