Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/385

 502us1$18Z 08-21-96 15:27:37 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 502 U. S. 224 (1991)

227

Per Curiam

arrested Bryant without probable cause. The majority concluded that the agents had failed to sustain the burden of establishing qualified immunity because their reason for arresting Bryant—their belief that the “Mr. Image” plotting to kill the President in Bryant’s letter could be a pseudonym for Bryant—was not the most reasonable reading of Bryant’s letter: “Even accepting the ‘alter ego’ theory that by warning what Mr. Image was going to do, Mr. Bryant was in fact communicating what he himself planned to do, the letter read in its entirety does not appear to make a threat against the president. Most of the letter does not even talk about President Reagan. A more reasonable interpretation of the letter might be that Bryant was trying to convince people of the danger Mr. Image and the conspiracy posed rather than that Bryant was speaking through Mr. Image.” Id., at 722 (emphasis added). Our cases establish that qualified immunity shields agents Hunter and Jordan from suit for damages if “a reasonable officer could have believed [Bryant’s arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 641 (1987). Even law enforcement officials who “reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present” are entitled to immunity. Ibid. Moreover, because “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985), we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 195 (1984); Mitchell, supra, at 526; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986); Anderson, supra, at 646, n. 6. The decision of the Ninth Circuit ignores the import of these decisions. The Court of Appeals’ confusion is evident