Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/361

 502us1$16L 08-21-96 15:27:13 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 502 U. S. 197 (1991)

203

Opinion of the Court

1990); D. C. Code Ann. § 36–301(9)(D) (1981); Ind. Code § 22– 3–79(d) (Supp. 1991); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1037 (West 1985); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48–106(1) (1988). Counsel for respondent in this case conceded during oral argument that petitioner may be precluded from seeking an alternative remedy under state law for his injuries, because of a like exclusion in South Carolina law. S. C. Code Ann. § 42–1–350 (1976). Our overruling Parden would require these States to reexamine their statutes, meanwhile putting at risk all employees and employers who have been acting on the assumption that they are protected in the event of injuries caused by an employer’s negligence. Overruling Parden would also throw into doubt previous decisions from this Court, cases holding that the entire federal scheme of railroad regulation applies to state-owned railroads. United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936) (Safety Appliance Act); California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957) (Railway Labor Act); see also Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982). These factors all weigh in favor of adhering to stare decisis, and we cannot find here sufficient, countervailing justifications for departing from our precedents. III Respondent argues that the Court has already considered and rejected these arguments for following stare decisis in Welch, 483 U. S., at 478. That is not accurate; and even if it were, Welch is not controlling here. The characterization of Welch is inaccurate because the most vital consideration of our decision today, which is that to confer immunity from state-court suit would strip all FELA and Jones Act protection from workers employed by the States, was not addressed or at all discussed in the Welch decision. Indeed, that omission can best be explained by the assumption, made express in the concurring opinion of Justice White, that