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ARDESTANI v. INS Blackmun, J., dissenting

to the EAJA. In my view, deportation proceedings exemplify the kind of adjudications for which Congress authorized fee awards: The alien’s stake in the proceeding is enormous (sometimes life or death in the asylum context); the legal rules surrounding deportation and asylum proceedings are very complex; specialized counsel are necessary but in short supply; and evidence suggests that some conduct on the part of the Government in deportation and asylum proceedings has been abusive. The Court’s opinion is all the more troubling for me, because it suggests that the Court has forgotten its recent admonition that the EAJA must be construed “in light of its purpose to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action.” Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877, 890 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, notably absent in the Court’s opinion is any account of the statutory purpose that could be advanced by excluding deportation proceedings from EAJA coverage. Proper application of established principles entitles Ardestani to a fee award. Accordingly, I dissent. I The Court correctly observes that petitioner Ardestani’s eligibility for EAJA fees depends upon whether a deportation proceeding qualifies as an “adversary adjudication.” The Act defines that key term in § 504(b)(1)(C)(i): “ ‘[A]dversary adjudication’ means. . . an adjudication under [5 U. S. C.] section 554. . . in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise.” Because all agree that the position of the United States in fact was represented by counsel, the only issue is whether a deportation proceeding can be construed as “an adjudication under section 554,” which is a part of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Respondent INS argues that the phrase “adjudication under section 554” is unambiguous and can refer only to an