Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/186

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HAFER v. MELO Opinion of the Court

discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as auditor general. We cannot accept the novel proposition that this same official authority insulates Hafer from suit. In an effort to limit the scope of her argument, Hafer distinguishes between two categories of acts taken under color of state law: those outside the official’s authority or not essential to the operation of state government, and those both within the official’s authority and necessary to the performance of governmental functions. Only the former group, she asserts, can subject state officials to personal liability under § 1983; the latter group (including the employment decisions at issue in this case) should be considered acts of the State that cannot give rise to a personal-capacity action. The distinction Hafer urges finds no support in the broad language of § 1983. To the contrary, it ignores our holding that Congress enacted § 1983 “ ‘to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.’ ” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 243 (1974) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 171–172). Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of ” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 929 (1982). Furthermore, Hafer’s distinction cannot be reconciled with our decisions regarding immunity of government officers otherwise personally liable for acts done in the course of their official duties. Her theory would absolutely immunize state officials from personal liability for acts within their authority and necessary to fulfilling governmental responsibilities. Yet our cases do not extend absolute immunity to all officers who engage in necessary official acts. Rather, immunity from suit under § 1983 is “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant