Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/184

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HAFER v. MELO Opinion of the Court

personal- and official-capacity actions. The principal issue in Will was whether States are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .” The Court held that interpreting the words “[e]very person” to exclude the States accorded with the most natural reading of the law, with its legislative history, and with the rule that Congress must clearly state its intention to alter “ ‘the federal balance’ ” when it seeks to do so. Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). The Court then addressed the related question whether state officials, sued for monetary relief in their official capacities, are persons under § 1983. We held that they are not. Although “state officials literally are persons,” an officialcapacity suit against a state officer “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” 491 U. S., at 71 (citation omitted). Summarizing our holding, we said: “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Ibid. Hafer relies on this recapitulation for the proposition that she may not be held personally liable under § 1983 for discharging respondents because she “act[ed]” in her official capacity as auditor general of Pennsylvania. Of course, the claims considered in Will were official-capacity claims; the phrase “acting in their official capacities” is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury. To the extent that Will