Page:United States Reports 502 OCT. TERM 1991.pdf/182

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HAFER v. MELO Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this portion of the District Court’s decision. 912 F. 2d 628 (1990). As to claims for reinstatement brought against Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983. See Will, supra, at 71, n. 10. Turning to respondents’ monetary claims, the court found that six members of the Gurley group had expressly sought damages from Hafer in her personal capacity. The remaining plaintiffs “although not as explicit, signified a similar intent.” 912 F. 2d, at 636.* The court found this critical. While Hafer’s power to hire and fire derived from her position as auditor general, it said, a suit for damages based on the exercise of this authority could be brought against Hafer in her personal capacity. Because Hafer acted under color of state law, respondents could maintain a § 1983 individual-capacity suit against her. We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 1118 (1991), to address the question whether state officers may be held personally liable for damages under § 1983 based upon actions taken in their official capacities. whether certain respondents brought their claims for damages against Hafer in her official capacity or her personal capacity. 912 F. 2d, at 635– 636. Several other Courts of Appeals adhere to this practice. See Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F. 2d 384, 394, n. 8 (CA7), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 856 (1988); Houston v. Reich, 932 F. 2d 883, 885 (CA10 1991); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F. 2d 600, 603–604 (CA11 1987). Still others impose a more rigid pleading requirement. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F. 2d 591, 592 (CA6 1989) (§ 1983 plaintiff must specifically plead that suit for damages is brought against state official in individual capacity); Nix v. Norman, 879 F. 2d 429, 431 (CA8 1989) (same). Because this issue is not properly before us, we simply reiterate the Third Circuit’s view that “[i]t is obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the first instance to avoid any ambiguity.” 912 F. 2d, at 636, n. 7. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court”).
 * The Third Circuit looked to the proceedings below to determine