Page:United States Reports, Volume 545.djvu/571



, dissenting supra, –. In Berman, for example, if the slums at issue were truly “blighted,” then state nuisance law, see, e. g., supra, ; Lucas, supra,, not the power of eminent domain, would provide the appropriate remedy. To construe the Public Use Clause to overlap with the States’ police power conﬂates these two categories.

The “public purpose” test applied by Berman and Midkiff also cannot be applied in principled manner. “When we depart from the natural import of the term ‘public use,’ and substitute for the simple idea of a public possession and occupation, that of public utility, public interest, common beneﬁt, general advantage or convenience. . . we are aﬂoat without any certain principle to guide us. ” Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 60–61 (NY 1837) (opinion of Tracy, Sen.). Once one permits takings for public purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent principle limits what could constitute a valid public use—at least, none beyond ’s (entirely proper) appeal to the text of the Constitution itself. See ante,, – (dissenting opinion). I share the Court’s skepticism about a public use standard that requires courts to second-guess the policy wisdom of public works projects. Ante, at 486–489. The “public purpose” standard this Court has adopted, however, demands the use of such judgment, for the Court concedes that the Public Use Clause would forbid a purely private taking.