Page:United States Reports, Volume 545.djvu/557



, dissenting Defying this understanding, the Court replaces the Public Use Clause with a “‘[P]ublic [P]urpose’” Clause, ante, at – (or perhaps the “Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society” Clause, ante, at 479 (capitalization added)), a restriction that is satisﬁed, the Court instructs, so long as the purpose is “legitimate” and the means “not irrational,” ante, (internal quotation marks omitted). This deferential shift in phraseology enables the Court to hold, against all common sense, that a costly urban-renewal project whose stated purpose is a vague promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agreeable to the Pﬁzer Corporation, is for a “public use.”

I cannot agree. If such “economic development” takings are for a “public use,” any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution, as powerfully argues in dissent. Ante, at, –. I do not believe that this Court can eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution and therefore join her dissenting opinion. Regrettably, however, the Court’s error runs deeper than this. Today’s decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public Use Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause’s original meaning, and I would reconsider them.

I

The Fifth Amendment provides:  “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any 