Page:United States Reports, Volume 545.djvu/527



Opinion of the Court in parcel 4A (park or marina support). It, however, denied petitioners relief as to the properties located in parcel 3 (ofﬁce space). App. to Pet. for Cert. 343–350.

After the Superior Court ruled, both sides took appeals to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. That court held, over a dissent, that all of the City’s proposed takings were valid. It began by upholding the lower court’s determination that the takings were authorized by chapter 132, the State’s municipal development statute. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8–186 et seq. (2005). That statute expresses a legislative determination that the taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic development project is a “public use” and in the “public interest.” 268 Conn., at 18–28, 843 A. 2d, at 515–521. Next, relying on cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, (1984), and Berman v. Parker,  (1954), the court held that such economic development qualiﬁed as a valid public use under both the Federal and State Constitutions. 268 Conn., at 40, 843 A. 2d, at 527.

Finally, adhering to its precedents, the court went on to determine, ﬁrst, whether the takings of the particular properties at issue were “reasonably necessary” to achieving the City’s intended public use, id., at 82–84, 843 A. 2d, at 552–553, and, second, whether the takings were for “reasonably foreseeable needs,” id., at 93–94, 843 A. 2d, at 558–559. The court upheld the trial court’s factual ﬁndings as to parcel 3, but reversed the trial court as to parcel 4A, agreeing with the City that the intended use of this land was sufﬁciently