Page:United States Reports, Volume 545.djvu/520



Syllabus

No. 04–108. Argued February 22, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005

After approving an integrated development plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy, respondent city, through its development agent, purchased most of the property earmarked for the project from willing sellers, but initiated condemnation proceedings when petitioners, the owners of the rest of the property, refused to sell. Petitioners brought this state-court action claiming, inter alia, that the taking of their properties would violate the “public use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of some of the properties, but denying relief as to others. Relying on cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,, and Berman v. Parker, , the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the proposed takings.

Held: The city’s proposed disposition of petitioners’ property qualiﬁes as a “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Pp. 477–490.

(a) Though the city could not take petitioners’ land simply to confer a private beneﬁt on a particular private party, see, e. g., Midkiff,, the takings at issue here would be executed pursuant to a carefully considered development plan, which was not adopted “to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals,” ibid. Moreover, while the city is not planning to open the condemned land—at least not in its entirety—to use by the general public, this “Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the. . . public.” Id.,. Rather, it has embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as “public purpose.” See, e. g., Fall brook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,,. Without exception, the Court has deﬁned that concept broadly, reflecting its long standing policy of deference to legislative judgments as to what public needs justify the use of the takings power. Berman, ; Midkiff, ; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,. Pp. 477–483.

(b) The city’s determination that the area at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to deference. The city has carefully formulated a development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including,