Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/692

Rh develop that evidence in state court, or (if he was at fault) if the conditions prescribed by § 2254(e)(2) were met. See Williams v. Taylor,, 431–437 (2000). Those same restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing. See, e. g., Cargle v. Mullin,, 1209 (CA10 2003), and cases cited. Where new evidence is admitted, some Courts of Appeals have conducted de novo review on the theory that there is no relevant state court determination to which one could defer. See, e. g., Monroe v. Angelone,, 297–299, and n. 19 (CA4 2003). Assuming, arguendo, that this analysis is correct and that it applies where, as here, the evidence does not support a new claim but merely buttresses a previously rejected one, it cannot support the Sixth Circuit's action.

The District Court made no finding that respondent had been diligent in pursuing Gooch's testimony (and thus that § 2254(e)(2) was inapplicable) or that the limitations set forth in § 2254(e)(2) were met. Nor did the Sixth Circuit independently inquire into these matters; it simply ignored entirely the state court's independent ground for its decision, that Gooch's statement was not properly before it. It is difficult to see, moreover, how respondent could claim due diligence given the 7 year delay. He complains that his state postconviction counsel did not heed his pleas for assistance. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 65. Attorney negligence, however, is chargeable to the client and precludes relief unless the conditions of § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied. See Williams, supra, at 439–440; cf. Coleman v. Thompson,, 753–754 (1991).

The Sixth Circuit therefore erred in ﬁnding the state court's decision an unreasonable application of Strickland.